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Race Equality After Enoch Powell 
 
Nasar Meer  
 
 ‘We won’t able to say “boo” to a nigger without being reported’i  
  
Fifty Years On 
This is a year of race related anniversaries. While it is fifty years since Enoch 
Powell’s infamous address to the West Midlands Area Conservative Political 
Association, it is seventy years since the Empire Windrush docked at Tilbury.  It is 
forty years, meanwhile, since Rock Against Racism (RAR) emerged as a cultural 
movement in response to far right activity, and it is twenty-five years since the racist 
murder of Stephen Lawrence would eventually lead, after six years of campaigning, 
to a public inquiry finding the UK’s largest Police Authority guilty of institutional 
racism. Moreover, and while Powell himself partly set his speech against 
international events, especially the US civil rights movement, his immediate catalyst 
was almost certainly the fifty-year-old Labour Government’s Race Relations Bill 1968 
which was due to receive its second reading only three days after his intervention.   
That Bill now forms part of an incremental race equality architecture which tried to 
address some of the weaknesses of its more voluntarist 1965 predecessor, explicitly 
making unlawful forms of discrimination on grounds of colour, race, ethnic or 
national origins in employment, housing and the provision of commercial and other 
services. Importantly, when it came into effect, the 1968 Act also created a 
forerunner to the later Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in the form of The 
Race Relations Board, which was charged with ensuring compliance with the 
legislation’s provisions, but also investigating complaints of discriminatory 
behaviour and supporting legal proceedings.  That the prospect of this legislation 
especially animated Powell was reflected in his characterisation of it as ‘one-way 
privilege’ and ‘a match on to gunpowder’. ‘The kindest thing that can be said about 
those who propose and support it’, he continued, ‘is that they know not what they 
do.’  
It is safe to assume that Powell was not making a comment on the potential 
weaknesses in the proposed Bill relative to its stated ambition; for it was soon after 
considered insufficiently effective in the areas of labour market participation where 
indirect discrimination remained unchallenged.  As such, a subsequent Labour 
Government committed to revising the legislation in the 1976 Race Relations Bill, 
stating: ‘the Government is convinced, as a result of its review of race relations 
generally and of the working of the legislation, that a fuller strategy to deal with 
racial disadvantage will have to be deployed than has been attempted so far’.ii 
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Indeed, it is now over 40 years since the introduction of this third Race Relations Act 
1976 cemented a state sponsorship of race equality by consolidating and then 
expanding the earlier, weaker legislative instruments (RRA 1965, 1968). Alongside a 
remit spanning public and private institutions, recognition of indirect discrimination 
and the imposition of a statutory public duty to promote good ‘race relations’, the 
1976 Act also created the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) to monitor 
implementation assist individual complainants.  As such it marked an important 
moment in an evolving settlement in which Citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth (CUKC), and subsequent British-born generations, became 
recognised as Black and Ethnic Minorities (BAME) requiring state support to 
overcome distinctive barriers in their exercise of citizenship.   
Of course the year of Powell’s speech was also the year of the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill 1968, which would specifically restrict entry to those who had a least 
one parent or grandparent born here. As a young Liberal Parliamentarian, Lord 
David Steel described this Bill as ‘an attempt to write into British Law legislation that 
discriminated between citizens on the grounds of race, and which represented a 
grave breech of international and internal political obligations’iii.  Of course Powell’s 
speech was no less relevant to this Immigration Bill than the Race Relations Bill, and 
indeed the speech was even credited with setting the Labour government’s 
immigration agenda.  As The Times editorial put it on the morning of the passing of 
the Immigration Act 1968, ‘What is the government so afraid of? Is it afraid of Mr 
Enoch Powell? […] It is probably the most shameful measure that Labour members 
have ever been asked by their whips to support’iv. 
An uneasy tension between the objectives of race equality and migration control 
therefore remains a characteristic of the UK story since Powell, a tension that is 
unsettled and periodically reveals itself, as illustrated by the recent Windrush 
scandal.  Here, a number of the children of black people who came to Britain from 
the Caribbean between 1948 and 1973, and who are legally entitled to live here, have 
in recent years seen their right to stay challenged.  Many of those affected moved to 
the UK as Commonwealth Citizens before their birth countries became independent, 
and for any number of reasons may not have applied for a British passport. 
Nonetheless, and despite some very challenging events over the years, the formal 
race equality legislation was never repealed but expanded, later incorporated, in a 
patchwork approach, into The Equality Act 2010 which brought together 
(occasionally levelled up) a number of protected ‘grounds’ of which race was one 
(e.g., race, gender, disability, age, sexuality, religion, marital status, etc).  Four years 
earlier the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) was incorporated into the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission (EHRC).   
While most certainly not unproblematic, these kinds of developments set out a 
markedly different approach to that of neighbouring European countries with 
comparable colonial histories.  For example, and during its experience of significant 
post-colonial settlement, France pursued a robustly assimilationist strategy in which 
equality was understood as uniformity and, until the beginning of this millennium, 
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Germany maintained a ‘returnist’ approach in which labour migrants were guest-
workers (gastarbeiter) expected to return to their country of origin.  In the UK, 
despite the traction of Powell and Powellites, and under the remit of the kinds of race 
equality legislation discussed above, there developed a formal approach to equal 
opportunity conceived as equal access to the labour market and other key spheres of 
British society (e.g., education, health and political participation).   
Against this background, and in this ‘anniversary’ year, a relevant question is: have 
these approaches been successful?  Much of course depends on the criteria of 
relevance.  If the intended objective of the initial and later race equality Bills was to 
reduce ethnic and racial disparities to a marginal or ‘negligible’ level, then the answer 
is most certainly not.  If the objective was slightly different, but not unrelated, and 
sought to reshape public conventions on racism (and ethnic and racial diversity more 
broadly), then the answer is more complicated and also unfinished.  In the next 
section I discuss the former, the scale and extent of racial and ethnic discrimination 
in contemporary Britain, and in the subsequent section I discuss the ways in which 
race equality may be coterminous with shifting narratives on difference. 
 
‘Did You Know…?’ 
 
 ‘If you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than 
if you’re white’, so Prime Minister Theresa May stated on the steps of 10 Downing 
Street as she assumed office in 2016v.  Seems like a rather long time ago now, but one 
of May’s first moves was to set up a Race Disparity Audit that would run from the 
Cabinet Office.vi  As somebody who participated in this, and convened an expert 
group on Scotland to feed into it, with the best will in the world it confirmed what we 
already knew. Namely, very significant ethnic and racial disparities continue to 
feature across all key sectors of British society.  As the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) elaboratedvii the disparity includes, in the area of employment, 
significantly higher BAME unemployment rates (as an aggregate about 12.9% 
compared with 6.3 % for White people).  Indeed, Trades Union Congress research 
highlights how 45% of black 16-24 year olds are unemployed, which is over double 
the level of unemployment of their white counterparts. and that this figure increased 
by 20% under early austerity measures since 2010 – did it increase more for black 
than white young people, and by 20% or 20 points? Meanwhile BAME employees 
with degrees earn 23.1% less on average than White workers  with comparable 
education and training – confirming this is no longer a ‘supply side’ deficit (not sure 
what ‘supply side deficit’ means in this context).viii   
 
In higher education, amongst Black-African and Black-Caribbean groups, just 6% of 
school leavers attended a Russell Group university, compared with 11% of White 
school leavers.  As for employment in the university sector, the Equality Challenge 
Unit’s audit shows that nearly 70 per cent of UK professorships are held by white 
men, while just under 22 per cent are held by white womenix. Some 7.3 per cent of 
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professors are BAME men, and just 1.9 per cent are BAME women.  Among 
university senior managers, 67.5 per cent are white male, 28.3 per cent white female, 
3.3 per cent are BAME male and only 0.9 per cent BAME female. In housing, 
meanwhile, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black adults are more likely to live in 
substandard accommodation than White people (around 30% compared with round 
8%). Indeed, over a decade ago, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation reported that in 
Britain 20% of white people were living in income poverty, compared to 30% of 
people with a Black Caribbean heritage, 45% Black African, 55% Pakistani and 65% 
Bangladeshi.  Given the disproportionate impact of austerity measures on BAME 
groups, there is every reason to anticipate that this disparity has increased.  In the 
area of criminal Justice, meanwhile, rates of prosecution and sentencing for Black 
African and African Caribbean people are three times higher than for White people –
18 per thousand population compared with six per thousand for White people. For 
sentencing  (I don’t understand what ‘sentencing’ refers to here) it was 13 per 
thousand population for Black people and five per thousand population for White 
people.x  As such, some 10% of the prison population is made up of black people, and 
the National Crime Intelligence DNA Database holds hold the records of 30% of all 
black men in Britain (10% for Whites and Asians), Black men are about four times 
more likely..than? figures given would suggest three times more likely than Whites 
and Asians, ie 30% cf 10%) to have their DNA stored).xi 
 
As if to demonstrate the law of unintended consequences, the only marked 
improvement under Prime Minister May’s tenure has been the increase of BAME 
Parliamentarians that came with the 2017 general election (an increase of 9 for 
Labour and 2 for the Conservatives, taking the total to 52).  Beyond this there is 
reason to fear that most of the entrenched inequalities will remain in place; they 
might assume some prominence when events make them difficult to ignore, but a 
serious commitment to challenging institutional racism, for example, is likely to be 
politically unpalatable, if it is even recognised as a problem.  This is not least because 
governing parties are often contributing to this.  Home Secretary May’s ‘Go Home’ 
campaign which was targeted at British BAME neighbourhoods as part of a ‘hostile 
environment’ approach to managing migration is not exceptional in this regard.  
 
Reason for such pessimism might be confirmed in the present scale of experiences of 
racial discrimination in contemporary Britain, which would need to improve if the 
kinds of structural outcomes described above are to alter.  For example, using the 
2015 Business in the Community (BITC) survey of 24,457 ethnic minority and white 
employees aged 16 and over and currently in employment in the UK (England, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland – redundant - delete), Ashe (2018) reports 
that 30% of participants ‘had witnessed or experienced racist harassment or bullying 
from managers, colleagues, customers or suppliers in the past year’, a finding that 
marks an increase on previous years 2 and 3-5 years earlier.  Drawing too on the 
Trades Union Council (TUC) survey of 5,191 people, ‘70% of Asian and Black workers 
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had experienced racial harassment at work in the last five years’, and similar 
numbers reported unfair treatment because of their race and ethnicity.xii  
 
What is true at the UK level is also reflected in specific parts of the UK that have not 
necessarily seen race as a central issue.  This includes Scotland, a country in which 
Powell had little traction, and which is worth considering because of how the topic of 
anti-racism (broadly conceived) has assumed a tacit role within Scottish political 
discourse, and in ways that some political actors have argued marks Scotland out as 
different from the UK.  Yet as recent survey work has shown, about a third of Black 
and Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups in Scotland continue to report experiences of 
racial discrimination, and a slightly higher number consider racial discrimination to 
be a widespread issue in Scotlandxiii.  Interestingly, the same research reports that 
60% of respondents who had experienced discrimination in the last five years did not 
report it to any kind of authority. This was despite 82% of the entire sample insisting 
they would encourage a friend or family to make a formal complaint if they thought 
they had experienced discrimination. What this implies is that significant degrees of 
both low-level and more obvious experiences of racial discrimination can go under-
reported.   
How should we understand this?  One means is to focus on everyday practice, in 
which surviving racial discrimination is a normalised strategy.  While limited, the 
lens of ‘racial microagressions’ is useful here.  With a provenance in Critical Race 
Theory (CRT), the concept of racial microagressions describe the ‘brief and common 
place daily verbal, behavioural, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or 
unintentional, that communicates hostile, derogatory or negative racial slights and 
insults’xiv.  If we accept that the understanding of race and racism cannot be reduced 
to a microagressions alone, it might be adopted with caution to explain how BAME 
groups compartmentalise or bracket off racial experiences in their wider negotiation 
of social life.  Of course this is a complex social practice, and as an explanation it is 
limited without qualitative data, but this reading is supported by studies that have 
undertaken precisely this type of work. Moreover, while we are talking here about 
subjectivity or people’s perceptions, it equally tied to material and institutional 
inequalities, something quite easily demonstrated by pointing to structural outcomes 
in Scotland that are consistent with those outlined as being true of the UK too. 
 
For example, a comprehensive analysis by the Scottish Parliament’s Equal 
Opportunities Committeexv noted that, despite equivalent education and skills, 
BAME Scots were more likely to be unemployed or in low-paid work than White 
people. This was especially highlighted in the written submission from the Coalition 
of Racial Equality and Rights (CRER), which stated that 17.7% of BAME people 
interviewed for local authority jobs were appointed, compared to a figure of 31.9% for 
white interviewees.  It is a finding that sits in a broader employment gap between 
BAME and white people in Scotland, and which Scottish Government dataxvi have 
shown to be significant: in 2013, 57.4% BAME groups were in employment compared 
with 73.8% of non-BAME groups. This discrepancy can be seen to permeate efforts to 
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redress inequalities too, with the Modern Apprenticeships being the most prominent 
example. Just 2.1% of people from BAME groups are in an apprenticeship, whereas 
5.2% are qualified to be in receipt of one.xvii (?? check reformulation – and how does 
this compare with other groups – could it be the result of low takeup more widely?) 
In different parts of the UK then, and across quite different sectors, fifty years on 
from Powell’s ‘foreboding’, race equality legislation has not achieved its stated 
objectives, and nor does it appear close to doing so. It is surely plausible however to 
deem that such legislation has stemmed racial inequalities from becoming greater, 
and that it has certainly provided means for redress which may not otherwise have 
emerged.   
 
More Than Legislation 
Confining race quality to legislation, however, overlooks how it may also 
shape prevailing mores and conventions.  Another way of putting this is to say that 
the public function of race-equality policy has been integral in cultivating what Bevir 
and Rhodesxviii have termed a ‘web of beliefs’ that can characterise certain polities.  
One way to think about race equality in this regard is to register that other things 
have flowed from it, including pluralised national identities and a wider set of 
multicultural accommodations that go beyond race equality in a narrow sense.  In 
some respects, Powell understood and feared most that this would lead to greater 
change, specifically because race equality takes on a discursive character that goes 
beyond public policy and administration, and tips into debates about identity, 
belonging and community formation.  
This was exemplified by the landmark report produced by the Commission on the 
Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB)xix, sponsored by the Runneymede Trust and 
chaired by the political philosopher, Lord Bhikhu Parekh.  This report made over 140 
policy recommendations to assist ‘a confident and vibrant multicultural society’ to 
take advantage of ‘its rich diversity’ in order that Britain should realise its full 
potential. Entitled The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, it strongly endorsed both the 
possibility and desirability of forging a meta-membership of ‘Britishness’ under 
which diversity could be sustained. To this end its recommendations not only sought 
to prevent discrimination or overcome its effects, but they simultaneously 
championed an approach that could move beyond conceptions of formal equality by 
recognising the substantive elements of ‘real differences of experience, background 
and perception’.  For example, the CMEB advocated a systematic type of ethnic 
monitoring that would ‘go beyond racism and culture blind strategies’, and could be 
implemented across public institutions to promote an awareness of cultural diversity 
in general, and unwitting discrimination in particular.  It claimed that while high-
profile statements of ideals by senior politicians and civil servants are important, 
‘they remain mere paper commitments or rhetoric, however, if they are not fully 
incorporated into all mainstream agendas and programmes’.  
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This was the post-Stephen Lawrence inquiry ‘multicultural moment’ when the New 
Labour government declared its commitment to creating a country where ‘every 
colour is a good colour’; where ‘everyone is treated according to their needs and 
rights’ and where ‘racial diversity is celebrated’xx. Individual politicians boasted that 
‘Britain’s pluralism is not a burden we must reluctantly accept. It is an immense asset 
that contributes to the cultural and economic vitality of our nation’xxi. In a similar 
vein, while attending the annual and predominantly Caribbean-influenced Notting 
Hill Carnival, the former Tory leader (later Foreign Secretary) William Hague was 
moved to assert that ‘Britain is a nation of immigrants’xxii.  As the then prime 
minister insisted: 
‘This nation has been formed by a particularly rich complex of experiences ... How 
can we separate out the Celtic, the Roman, the Saxon, the Norman, the Huguenot, 
the Jewish, the Asian and the Caribbean and all the other nations [sic] that have 
come and settled here? Why should we want to? It is precisely this rich mix that has 
made all of us what we are today’xxiii.  
A great deal has happened between then and now, of course, but despite the 
increasingly negative rhetoric the alleged ‘retreat’ from multiculturalism is shown, on 
balance, not to be true of existing public policiesxxiv.  What has come to the fore is an 
increased insistence on something like a prescribed ‘political culture, which includes 
its [society’s] public or political values, ideals, practices, institutions, modes of 
political discourse, and self-understanding’xxv. Some have deemed this mode of 
integration – comprising at least partial assimilation, and even advocated as a 
solution to the sorts of societal disunity allegedly associated with ethnic minority 
separatism in general, and Muslim alienation, estrangement (and ultimately violent 
radicalism) in particular.  The Coalition government (2010-2015) strategy document, 
Creating the Conditions for Integration, specifically emphasized integration as an 
antidote to extremism and intolerance.  What has come to define integration talk 
since has been a focus on creeping change and dangers to the cohesiveness of the 
nation – precisely the issues Powell traded in.  
For example, the idea of ‘Fundamental British Values’, now assumes a prominent 
place in the National Curriculum and elsewhere, and is promoted by the Department 
for Education (DfE) as ‘not undermining the fundamental British values, including 
democracy, the rule of law and individual liberty’xxvi – a tautological but statutory 
guidance pursued in schools through ‘Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural’ 
development (SMSC)xxvii.  This is linked to a broad expansion of counter terrorism 
approaches, especially the Prevent duty guidancexxviii, which explicitly uses 
Fundamental British Values within the definition of extremism.  Indeed, in the 
current Government Green Paper Integrated Communities, extremism is said to be 
anticipated where there are ‘negative cultural norms’xxix.  As a consequence, the 
government is presently promoting the idea that some minority communities are a 
security risk not because they incite or engage in violence or activities that might do 
so, but because they bear values that do not conform to those insisted upon by the 
government of the day. 
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What is true of the identity features of non-legal conventions around race equality is 
further complicated by the prospect of Brexit.  In one respect it is difficult – although 
not impossible - to imagine that a post Brexit administration would actively unpick 
the domestication of the equality components of significant European legislation 
such as the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999, especially since the UK was already 
compliant with race equality provisions. The Equality Act 2010 is not merely about 
being compliant with EU directives, but reflects an endogenous trajectory in 
incorporating the existing race equality provisions discussed in part two. This means 
that the ‘sunk costs’, as Awestixxx calls them, and which extend to wider patterns of 
societal level adaptation, are likely to be ‘sticky’ regardless of the ‘current preferences 
of political leaders’– or what James Maddison memorably termed the ‘mischief of 
faction’.  What is less certain is whether Brexit will diminish the ‘policy image’ of race 
equality, as something associated with an EU imposition, rather than an endogenous 
creation. Race equality in these circumstances becomes much more contested by 
those seeking to uncouple as much as they can from the EU. Put in other terms, if 
race equality becomes part of the ‘collateral rhetoric’xxxi of Brexit, rather than a 
longstanding – though unsettled and incomplete – British conversation, then the 
symbolic politics of this would do great harm.  
 
Fifty Years Ahead  
The prospect of Brexit and the anniversary of Powell’s speech can therefore 
converge on the continuing challenge as to how best to help to ensure that race 
equality is able to meet its stated objectives.  This should proceed, first, from 
continuing to name racial inequalities and not pretend these inequalities are an 
aberration in an otherwise race-less, meritocratic society.  This runs counter to 
Powell’s insistence that racial inequalities were a consequence of ‘those personal 
circumstances and accidents which cause, and always will cause, the fortunes and 
experience of one man to be different from another's’. The emphasis needs to be 
structural disparities, but which also bring together attitudes and institutions. This 
involves recognising the ideational and discursive features of race equality, as well as 
its structural components.   While this requires making the connections between 
economic, social and political features of race inequalities, it would also help if we 
could get beyond the plucky Brits and Dunkirk movie myths. As a set of nations, the 
UK has not done everything on its own not against the odds.  The forebears of Black 
and Brown Brits often did the heavy lifting and that is why we are here.  Or, as the 
late Sivanandan put it, ‘we are here because you were there’xxxii.  Finally, we need to 
take ownership of racial inequalities as part of our story as a society, and do so 
without being defensive. The population of Britain has changed, and many things 
we’ve got right.  The UK leads Europe in burgeoning mixed racial and ethnic 
populations. At the last census nearly 1/10 of people in England and Wales were 
cohabiting or married in a mixed relationship (2.3million) (about 10 times the EU 
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average). How unfortunate then if the racial story of the near past should become the 
racial story of the future.     
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